



**EMBASSY OF THE ARAB
REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
TOKYO**

**THE TWENTIETH UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES**

**PLENARY I
SESSION II**

***“THE 2010 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
REVIEW CONFERENCE:
CRAFTING A CONSENSUS”***

**INTERVENTION
BY**

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The 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference:
Crafting a Consensus

1. Introductory remarks and expression of appreciation to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, the Government of Japan, and Saitama City.
2. Today we are here to discuss how we can “*craft a consensus*” at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. But before we can look forward, we must pause and take stock of what was previously agreed upon in prior Review Conferences, ascertain how far we have come in implementing some of those agreements, and truthfully acknowledge why others have been unduly neglected or even intentionally negated.
3. Over 13 years have passed since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference was held. It is an undeniable fact that the only component of the Package of three Decisions and Resolution adopted by consensus at that time that has been fully implemented is Decision III pertaining to the indefinite extension of the Treaty.
4. The primary conclusion that we can draw from this situation is that the credibility and viability of the Treaty – as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime – have been severely undermined. This undermined credibility and viability is further accentuated when we consider the lack of progress in implementing the remaining elements of the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference.
5. Any effort to retract endorsement of previously agreed outcomes of review processes highlights the erosion of common understanding among States Parties, reflects the uncertainty concerning the value of the review process itself, and disrupts the balance of Treaty provisions.
6. Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the NPT at this juncture, a challenge that lies at the root of a multitude of interconnected issues, is that of realizing the Universality of the Treaty. Universality is specified in Decision II of the 1995 NPTREC as

an urgent priority, especially for states that operate unsafeguarded nuclear activities. Realizing such an objective is a central element in achieving international peace and security.

7. This is the primary responsibility of all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council by virtue of their special responsibilities in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
8. In order to enhance the relevance of the NPT, Egypt deems it essential that the 2010 Review Conference adopt an action plan on NPT Universality, which would encompass a series of practical steps for the systematic and progressive achievement of full and complete Universality as per Para. 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference Decision II on Principles and Objectives.
9. Given the primacy of this issue, it is also necessary that the forthcoming Review Conference call on States Parties to the NPT to report to each session of the Preparatory Committee and to the Review Conference itself on their practical and specific efforts undertaken to fulfill their obligations pertaining to the achievement of this objective.
10. Treaty Universality must constitute a priority of the Review Conference in view of its association with the implementation of the 1995 NPTREC Package of Decisions and Resolution. Universality will also undoubtedly go a long way towards addressing the security concerns of States Parties and further guarantee compliance with the Treaty provisions and help prevent any possibility of a nuclear arms race.
11. It is also important to note that the priority of achieving NPT Universality is a necessary first step towards the universal application and strengthening of IAEA Full Scope Safeguards. Any efforts to the contrary disrupt the delicate regional and international balances in place, especially in the Middle East. Egypt firmly rejects any attempts to impose additional obligations (such as the Additional Protocol) on Non-Nuclear Weapon States, which are already in compliance with their commitments under the Treaty, if they are not reciprocated by equal and commensurate measures by states that still remain

outside the Treaty and are not bound by Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements.

12. We should always remember that the NPT was never intended to remain non-universal, neither during its original 25 year term nor after its indefinite extension in 1995. If we are to preserve the integrity and credibility of the Treaty, the 2010 Review Conference must address the issue of Universality clearly and unambiguously.
13. Another equally serious concern that undermines the integrity of the NPT is the lack of progress, in real terms, in compliance with Article VI of the Treaty. And here again, we must always recall that the NPT was never designed to allow the Nuclear Weapon States to maintain their nuclear arsenals in perpetuity; indeed the Treaty acknowledged from the outset the transitional status of the capabilities of the Nuclear Weapon States, and its very premise is based on the concept of the individual and collective renouncement of nuclear weapons which will never be effective if applied partially or selectively.
14. It also goes without saying that any quantitative reduction of nuclear weapons that is coupled by an almost simultaneous qualitative increase in nuclear capabilities does not constitute compliance neither with the letter nor with the spirit of Article VI.
15. We must all recognize that the starting point for the fulfillment of Article VI at the 2010 Review Conference must be premised on the renunciation of nuclear doctrines as part of the strategic national security policies of the Nuclear Weapons States and the prompt commencement of negotiations, in good faith, on a treaty on general and complete nuclear disarmament under strict effective international control.
16. The importance of such a treaty was further reinforced by the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. The 2010 Review Conference must therefore indicate its support for the unanimous conclusion of the Court that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

17. The challenges facing the NPT, and the preservation of its credibility, indefinite extension and indeed relevance, can only be satisfactorily addressed through the comprehensive and non-selective adherence to all the provisions of the Treaty and the full implementation of all the components of the 1995 NPTREC outcome along with the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000.
18. No discussion of our aspirations for the 2010 Review Conference will be complete without addressing the situation in the Middle East. The Resolution on the Middle East is undoubtedly one of the most important outcomes of the 1995 NPTREC and constitutes an essential element of the consensus Package that was adopted at the time. The full implementation of all the elements of this Package, including the ME Resolution, is a necessary prerequisite to ensure its overall continued validity. Any reluctance in implementing any one of those components will only undermine the integrity and implementation of the entire Package, and this is a serious consequence that we should all strive to avoid.
19. As far as it relates to the NPT and its review process, the Resolution on the ME focused on the achievement of THREE clear objectives:
 - The establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East.
 - The accession to the NPT by states of the region that have not yet done so.
 - The placement of all nuclear facilities in the Middle East under Full Scope IAEA Safeguards.
20. The lack of progress towards the implementation of the 1995 Resolution can only perpetuate a situation that constitutes a direct threat to regional and international peace and security, and increases the potential for a nuclear arms race in the region.
21. Israel's continued refusal to accede to the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State and place all of its nuclear facilities under IAEA Full Scope Safeguards, as well its reluctance to take any positive steps towards the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, only compound the risks of regional nuclear weapons proliferation. The perpetuation of this inequitable situation is

both unacceptable and untenable. The credibility of the Treaty amongst all States Parties of the region is being seriously compromised by a single state that continues to remain exempt from its Provisions.

22. Until it is fully implemented, the 1995 Middle East resolution remains fully valid, as underscored by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. 13 years have passed since the adoption of the Resolution, and yet States Parties – especially certain Nuclear-Weapons States – have demonstrated a lack of political will, and indeed an incredible degree of disregard, for the fulfillment of their Treaty obligations and commitments undertaken freely at the past Review Conferences.
23. The NPT is already facing a plethora of serious challenges, and it will be further undermined if the 2010 Review Conference fails to address the ever-important situation in the Middle East and implement the provisions of the Resolution adopted by consensus in 1995. Egypt's views on this matter are well known, and the concrete measures that we have put forward towards operationalizing the 1995 Middle East Resolution are well documented, including in the working papers we have been submitting to previous Review Conferences and their Preparatory Committees.
24. Our efforts to operationalize the 1995 ME Resolution are complemented by our actions in Vienna and New York, through the annual introduction of a resolution on the "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East" before the IAEA General Conference, along with the two annual resolutions we introduce before the UNGA on 'The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East' and "The Establishment of a NWFZ in the region of the Middle East". Egypt continues to call on all member states – especially those who profess to support the establishment of a NWFZ in the ME – to lend their valuable support to these three resolutions. We also hope that this support will be aptly reflected in the positions of the States Parties at the 2010 Review Conference when they consider the situation in the Middle East.
25. If we are to "*craft a consensus*" at the 2010 Review Conference, as the title of this session suggests, States Parties should and must

address all of the above-mentioned issues in a balanced manner. Furthermore, no State Party should seek to undermine any of the three fundamental pillars of the NPT (nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy) while focusing solely – or even primarily – on the one pillar that it deems requires the most urgent attention. And above all, the “*Grand Bargain*” on which the NPT itself was designed – along with the legally binding commitments it places on all States Parties – must be honored in both letter and spirit.

26. If these fundamental principles are upheld, and translated into concrete action and not just mere rhetoric, States Parties will have a golden opportunity to achieve the consensus that the majority of them desire at the 2010 Review Conference. States Parties have a stark choice before them; they can either emulate the equitable approach that led to the adoption of a consensus Package at the 1995 NPTREC, or they can entertain a selective and negative posture as some of them did during the 2005 Review Conference and run the risk of further undermining the Treaty at a time when the international community perhaps needs it the most.

